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Abstract
The aim of this research is to analyse the importance of cultural and institutional
determinants in attracting FDI to transition countries. We rely on gravity econo-
metric framework and examine the impact of cultural and institutional factors on
FDI using bilateral FDI flows between home (i.e. major trading partners) and eight
transition economies in the period 2000–2018. We study this relationship in an
integrated framework considering principal gravity forces, traditional FDI deter-
minants, policy and institutional factors. We provide strong and robust evidence
that cultural factors, depicted in Hofmann cultural indices, influence MNCs’ loca-
tional decisions. Other things held constant, specific cultural features seem more
important than formal institutions, which seems at odds with standard neoclassical
propositions, and shed some new light on the way we understand international
business transactions.
Keywords: FDI, cultural factors, institutional factors, gravity model,
transition economies
1. Introduction
Foreign Direct Investments (hereinafter: FDI) has been largely found to posi-
tively affect economic growth in transition economies. Increases in FDI have been
associated with productivity and export growth of local companies via knowledge
spillovers and complementary effects on domestic investment. The impact of FDI
on economic growth seems, however, conditional on the level of human capital and
absorptive capacity of a host economy. Determinants of FDI in transition economies
have been intensely researched highlighting the importance of traditional factors,
institutions and policy choices in determining locational decisions of multinational
corporations (MNCs). Although informal institutions and cultural factors have
increasingly been characterised as important factors that off-set for the underde-
veloped institutional capacity of transition economies, the impact of cultural ties on
FDI remains fairly under researched. Informal economic structures and cultural
similarities emanate trust and enable strong business ties across borders. How
important are these factors in explaining differences in FDI flows among transition
economies is the principal question investigated in this research.
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Culture, in a broader sense, means a pattern of behaviour based on values and
beliefs that develops over time in a particular society. While culture in a narrower
sense represents the way of life of a social group, i.e. a society that includes lan-
guage, tradition, knowledge, customs, laws, art and other tangible and intangible
features of social life that are passed down through generations, cultural is of course
subject to change. Culture includes a set of values and attitudes of a homogeneous
group of people that are passed down from generation to generation, and these
patterns of behaviour change rather slowly.
The importance of cultural factors has been increasingly emphasised in the FDI
literature. In particular, the impact of cultural distance between home and host
countries has found to be significant in number of studies investigating the role of
culture in explaining FDI flows. However, few studies concentrated on the transi-
tion economies of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries are viewed as
specific in terms of both scope of economic and institutional transformation, and
specific (common) legacies of socialism. We contribute to recent literature on FDI
in transition economies, by analysing the significance of broad set of institutional
and cultural indicators ought to influence MNC decisions on where to invest. A
special reference is given to the discussion on the relationship between formal and
informal institutions, assumed to be predominantly depicted in cultural dimensions
of a specific country. In addition, the relevance of specific Hofstede cultural
dimension to foreign firms is brought to the fore. Having said this, the hypothesis
tested imply ‘favourable cultural context’ that is, specific cultural characteristics
that are assumed to be preferred by foreign firms. We posit somewhat universal
aspects of culture related to Hofstede cultural dimensions that constitute favourable
cultural environment to foreign firms. Furthermore, we make use of the gravity
model and the panel data framework to examine the importance of relative differ-
ences between home and host country characteristics in explaining bilateral FDI
stock. The gravity-panel empirical framework allows us to draw important and
detailed conclusions with respect to the relative importance of formal institutions
vs. cultural aspects to foreign firms. Our dataset includes 10 source countries (i.e.
major trading partners) and 8 home countries (transition economies of Central
Eastern and South East Europe for which the cultural indicators were available).
This paper is structured as follows. Next we elaborate on basic theoretical prop-
ositions underpinning the mechanism of institutional and cultural influence on FDI,
with special reference to empirical work on the matter. In discussion theoretical and
empirical issues, we present the conceptual framework for the empirical strategy
used in this analysis discussing number of important issues including interplay
between culture institutions and FDI, definitions and measurement issues, and
research hypothesis. The third section relates to the empirical analysis where
detailed description of the model, data and variables and methodology employed is
provided and followed by the interpretation of the empirical results. The conclusion
follows.
2. Institutions, culture and FDI: conceptual framework
and literature review
2.1 Institutions: what they are and why they are important?
Institutional environment often encompasses political systems, policy making
and policy enforcing institutional structures which determine economic structures
at the national and sub-national levels. It includes institutional setting that provides
formal rules of the game and sets forth the incentives to economic/societal agents as
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well as informal norms, set of beliefs, systems of values, customs considered also an
important feature of the institutional environment of a given country. Different
scholars perceive differently the relative importance of these various components,
including the role played by formal and informal rules and conventions as well as
the importance of and role played by organisations, encompassing both economic
and social agents of various sorts.
They are competing theoretical perceptions and different values attached to
institutions and organisations in the contemporary literature [1–3]. Generally,
institutions are perceived as frames or rules of the game while organisations are
defined as social agents constituting and carrying these rules [2]. Importantly, the
relationship between institutions and organisations is not a straight forward one.
There is a general consensus among scholars that institutions principally evolve in
response to market- related imperfections, and as such, institutions are considered a
mechanism to enhance efficiency associated with economic transactions. However,
whether institutions evolve primarily in response to changes in values, perception
and attitudes embodied in organisations (i.e. various social agents) including theirs’
perceived inefficiencies in functioning of the market, or whether institutional
development can be viewed as principally exogenous process where norms domi-
nantly govern actions of social agents is still a debated issue [1–3]. Relate to this is a
question whether institutional development is constrained by organisations’ pref-
erences and capacities? Arguably the answer to these questions depends on how we
perceive institutions and how do we value the relative importance of institutions vis
a vis organisations.
The theoretical conceptualisation of institutions has mostly favoured the stream
of literature which views institutions as frames or rules of the game which both
guide and constrain actions of social agents i.e. organisations of various sorts
including political and economic agents that make up societies. This stream of
literature suggests the dichotomy between institutions and organisations. Accord-
ingly institutions reveal formal and informal rules and conventions which set the
structures within which, and upon which societal agents act [1, 2]. More precisely,
the dichotomy in the words of [2] implies a clear conceptual distinction between
institutions and organisations as follows; institutions define ‘the rules’ of the game
and organisations are ‘the players’ by whom the game is played. Similarly, [4]
suggests that institutions provide the set of rules defining frames within which
organisations act. This is where the importance of cultural dimensions become
crucial in understanding the institutional performance and in particular the differ-
ences in economic performance among countries amid similar institutional devel-
opment and/or quality of institutions.
In this respect, ‘good’ institutions are only necessary but not sufficient condition
to promote successful change within a society and/or to achieve desired societal
goals. This view implies that although institutions evolve in response to market
failures encompassing various forms of imperfections related to economics trans-
actions and exchange they evolve in particular socio-historical context, and in
accordance with prevailing preferences, norms and ethics of organisations that
embody, interpret and influence the institutional conditions i.e. the specific
(endogenous) rule setting [5]. These endogenous norms and values of a society have
been embedded in what we call informal institutional structures of the economy.
Put differently, formal institutions are embodied in culture, and culture matters for
understanding the link between formal and informal institutional setting of indi-
vidual countries [2, 6, 7]. The culture of a society determines informal behavioural
patterns of economic agents, and by that the quality and the efficiency of formal
institutions. This is to say that institutions, e.g. the relevance of formal rules,
adherence to formal principles and legal provisions rests within organisation and
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agencies that is with people who implement those rules. This stream of literature,
which identifies culture as important aspect of formal institutions, may help us
disentangle the relationship between formal and informal institutions, and, in par-
ticular, may help us comprehend how societies with similar quality of formal insti-
tutions have divergent economic outcomes.
As pointed by [8], it is possible that societies with identical institutional setting
perform differently assuming that societal agents are not ‘passive’ but influence and
determine the outcomes of any particular institutional structure in relation to their
competences and preferences as well as in relation to what is called informal insti-
tutions. The latter include rather endogenous institutional features or their evolu-
tion such as norms, social ethics, prevalence of (old) institutional legacies, initial
institutional conditions, institutional and individual’s values and competences. This
would imply that it does not suffice to develop ‘quality’ institutions in the form of
extensive and desirable legislative and institutional infrastructures, or ‘optimal’ set
of rules, but also necessary organisational capabilities that affect policy impacts and
subsequent institutional change. Institutional development should be perceived as a
long-term process of societal change, a one that certainly involves the development
of ‘better’ or ‘improved’ conventions but importantly the process that rests on the
commitment and competences of prevailing human and organisations kinds
involved in those processes.1
Here it is important to emphasise that theoretic perspective of institutions mat-
ters for: (i) our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of institutional devel-
opment and change; ii) the importance of informal institutional structures and their
link with formal institutions; as well as iii) the way we measure institutions in our
empirical analysis. As pointed by [8]: “Whether institutions are viewed as endogenous
to the relevant domain or exogenously set in the polity may have significant implications
for the role of public policy.” This is to say that if institutions are exogenous than we
could relatively easily transplant the best practices of other (more advanced) coun-
tries in the forms of formal rules and conventions and anticipate increases in
efficiency and welfare. If the reverse is true, and if institutions evolve principally in
relation to a country specific historical, political and cultural context assuming
interdependence among institutions, constrained and influenced by informal norms
and social ethics, competences and capabilities of human and organisation kind,
then the intended outcomes and consequences of any institutional conditions would
vary considerably in relation to these important but intrinsic features of a given
country. These raise important considerations for researches analysing the role of
institutions in economic performance as well as international business.
The comparison of transition institutional reform, particularly the evidence
revealing contrasting experiences and institutional performance across countries,
however, led to doubts and seriously questioned the conventional wisdom of
straightforward transplantation of practices of developed market economies [9–11].
Contrary to what has been expected, the years of transition saw institutional build-
ing and reform as exceptionally challenging and complex. The initial years of tran-
sition witnessed the remarkable differences in institutional progress among
transition economies (EBRD, 2001). Empirical evidence point to the highly intrinsic
and endogenous nature of institutional development including the varying institu-
tional performance among transition economies [9–12]. Transition economies were
faced with the necessity to reform their economic and institutional structures on a
large scale moving from centrally planned to free market economic system and




resource allocation. The conventional economic wisdom implied that former cen-
trally planned economies needed to develop institutions which underpin free mar-
ket transactions and well functioning of the markets as quickly as possible. The
importance of institutional environment conducive to rapid market development
has been put high on the transition reform agenda. The initial institutional devel-
opment in transition economy context reflected the establishment of institutions
fundamental to free-market economies including setting proper incentives through
policies of macroeconomic-stability, price liberalisation, denationalisation and
privatisation, as well as through institutions underpinning effective financial sector
reform and private sector growth. The prevailing conceptualisation of institutions
at the time envisaged that institutions are somewhat easily transferable, exoge-
nously created whereby institutions are built following best practices elsewhere
[13]. However, over the course of transition, growing empirical evidence on the
matter of institutional change in transition suggested that the important historical,
political and social factors have played a role. The empirical studies pointed to the
interrelatedness and interdependence between institutions and diverse political,
cultural and economic contexts of a given country [8]. Among others, the initial
institutional conditions and institution-related legacies, as well as cultural dimen-
sions largely influenced the pace and character of institutional development in
transition economies (see [11, 14]).
Despite these efforts, we do have a limited understanding of the processes and
lack meaningful explanation on the diverging pattern of institutional development
among countries including TEs. Analysing relationship between formal and infor-
mal institutions may help disentangle differences in institutional performance
among transition economies. Such analysis is fairly constrained by number of diffi-
culties including conceptualisation of the relationship, as well as data limitations
and number of measurement issues related to informal institutions of the economy.
We believe that indicators of cultural dimensions may help comprehend at least
some aspect of this complex relationship. In view of this, we argue, that it is
important to study institutions in an integrated framework, and point to the
relevance of cultural factors.
In this paper, an attempt is made to illuminate the importance of formal institu-
tions relative to the distinctive cultural features of a society in comprehending
differences in FDI flows across transition economies. We use a narrow-definition of
institutions and focus on institutions revealing principally formal rules specifically
related to FDI such as the rule of law and corruption. Relying on previous empirical
work, we emphasise the importance of corruption [15–18], regulatory and gover-
nance indicators [19–21], as well as legal indicators in our empirical analysis. We
identify institutional variables to be included in the model based on these results,
and include three institutional variables (Corruption, Good governance and Rule of
Law and Efficiency). Since we investigate the impact of institutional factors on FDI
in transition economies, we do not use Political stability variable amid low variation
in the data, and relatively similar Political stability index across CEE transition
economies. In the light of the forgoing discussion, however, we acknowledge that
by the way we measure institutional dimension in this analysis we possibly do not
account for complex informal social structures (including social ethics and norms,
preferences and capabilities of organisations) which may well influence the out-
comes of institutional environment in a given country. This is why we include
cultural indicators (Hofstende Cultural Dimensions) in the analysis in order to
account for important aspects of both institutional and cultural behaviour of indi-
vidual (host) countries that may influence FDI flows in transition economies.
While there is considerable number of studies analysing the impact of formal
institutions on FDI, very little empirical research has been done on the importance
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of culture, and cultural factors in determining FDI. Furthermore, we study the
impact of institutional and cultural factors on FDI in an integrated framework,
where we assess the relative importance of formal institutions vs. cultural factors.
2.2 Culture and its relevance for understanding institutions-FDI nexus
Informal institutions are often considered important determinant of FDI since
they could compensate for the deficiencies associated with underperforming or
poor quality formal institutions. Despite this, they are often overlooked in the FDI
literature whereby the emphasis is given to the quality of formal institutions per se.
The rationale behind is that while formal institutions ensure efficiency of foreign
operations in a new environment, informal institutions mostly favour local eco-
nomic agents. Local agents are assumed to have better access to political and local
facilities and processes. Given this, reliance on informal institutions in ensuring
efficient economic transactions is least favoured by MNCs. A study by [22, 23] have
shown that institutional development in transition economies has had an impact on
foreign investors’ strategic decisions, arguably their entry modes, whereby quality
of formal institutions seems of greater importance for establishing wholly owned
ventures. The study by [22] reveals evidence that quality of institutions does seem
to impact type of ownership related to FDI, where poor institutional development is
more likely to result in network- types of FDI (i.e. joint-ventures, contracts). This is
why the FDI literature mostly emphasise the relevance of formal institutions as
locational advantage as reliance on informal institutions tend to increase transaction
costs of foreign investors relative to domestic agents. The cultural features seem to
have been disregarded as important factors which influence the way in which
markets develop and evolve.
Notwithstanding this, in this paper we argue that cultural dimension is impor-
tant determinant of FDI, in the sense that culture ‘shape’ formal institutions (see for
instance [24]). Cultural dimensions of a society depict ways in which ‘nations’ tend
to understand the rules and norms of social behaviour. The role played by formal
institution(s) within a society and their relative importance vis a vis informal social
structures (e.g. social networks, linkages) is deeply rooted cultural phenomena. The
perception of formal institutions that prevails among general public, on this partic-
ular matter, is important to be understood, when examining the relationship
between formal institutions and FDI. Having said this, culture may reflect on ‘tacit’
aspects of general-purpose or more specific ‘market-enhancing’ institutions within
countries. The diverse and distinct concepts of social behaviour, present important
features of a society that not only influence and model the behaviour of local
economic agents, but affect the quality and the efficiency of formal institutions.
Reliance on informal institutions as opposed on formal institutions may well be
associated with weak and malfunctioning formal institutional structures. On this
ground it seems reasonable to posit that informal institutions reflected in cultural
dimensions are also likely to influence MNC’s decisions on where to invest.
Overall, we strongly believe that the essential question on the matter of culture-
institutions-FDI nexus, is to what extent ‘formal institutions’ and the why we
measure them, reflect society’s adherence to formal rules, as opposed to society’s
‘modus operandi’ e.g. collective actions, practices, behaviours that may contradict
formal codes of conduct? Here it is worthwhile mentioning the theory of ‘institu-
tional stickiness’ which firmly explains the relationship between culture and insti-
tutions [25]. The authors posit that formal institutions are stuck to what they call
‘metis’, which may be defined as ‘values’ that are largely ‘exogenous’ to people and




Therefore, relying solely on formal institutions, and formal institutional indica-
tors of one country, including various legal indicators that are of specific interest to
FDI, when analysing the importance of formal institutions, may be associated with
ambiguities and uncertain ‘policy’ implications. This is not to say that formal insti-
tutions are of less importance, but it is at least important to acknowledge that ‘good’
institutions are embodied in culture. These societal values, attitudes and norms
evolve overtime and reinforce formal institutions [25, 26]. This means that over-
time, cultural changes influence acceptance of formal institutions as values of a
society in general, and society at large adheres to these formal ‘rules of the game’.
Along the lines of these theoretical propositions, [6] investigates both direct and
indirect effect of culture on FDI, and finds that culture impact FDI indirectly
through its impact on formal institutions, as well as directly. The indirect impact of
culture on FDI is mediated via formal institutions, which confines the hypothesis
that culture ‘shape formal institutions’. Essentially, the impact of cultural factors is
found to be more important than the impact of formal institutions. Similarly, a
recent study by [27] finds significant and greater effect of cultural factors
(embeddedness vs. autonomy; hierarchy vs. egalitarianism, mastery vs. harmony)
than formal institutions in cross-country regressions. Both studies render support to
the theoretical propositions underlying the importance of cultural factors in
comprehending role played by formal institutions, as well as that distinctive
features of national cultures influence FDI flows.
Culture seems to reveal hidden behavioural patterns that underpin societal
prosperity, including society relation to and the perception of responsibility, ethics
and trust. The idea that these norms affect companies’ efficiency and growth pros-
pects cannot be dismissed. On the contrary, these factors should be perceived as
important determinants of FDI that not only minimise transaction costs, but also
enhance productivity potential of foreign affiliates, and/or simply create an envi-
ronment conducive to business growth. Such an environment is perceived as
friendly and or familiar market from MNC perspective. What kind of information
MNC search for when deciding about new investment site is important? Do man-
agers look at formal institutional indices, or have other sources of knowledge and
information that reveal ‘true’ that is prevailing aspects of social relations, ethics and
norms? Studying the impact of formal institutions on FDI, in an integrated frame-
work in which we control for cultural factors, along with traditional FDI determi-
nants, becomes of crucial importance.
In what follows we discuss in greater detail the relevance of culture in interna-
tional business and briefly review past empirical research on the role of culture in
attracting FDI.
2.3 What role for culture in attracting FDI
According to the literature cultural dimension can influence foreign direct
investments in two ways. First theoretical proposition suggest that more culturally
diverse societies tend to be perceived as favourable cultural environment by MNC,
while the second theoretical proposition implies that foreign investors prefer to
invest in cultures similar to their own. These two distinct theoretical perspectives
imply first that more culturally diverse societies positively impact foreign direct
investments, and second that lower cultural distance between home and host
countries positively affects FDI. As for the former, culturally diverse countries
reflect on more open and welcoming societies that are viewed positively by
foreign companies. As for the latter cultural difference between home and host
countries is often associated with high transaction cost arising from uncertainty
and lower FDI.
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2.3.1 Cultural diversity and religion as cultural factors influencing FDI
Alesina [28] argues that high level of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity
requires well functioning governments and as such is positively associated with
FDI. Additionally, more culturally diverse society is more tolerable and less reluc-
tant to foreigners, which is perceived positively by MNCs. A number of research
investigate the impact of religious factors including religion diversity and pluralism
[29, 30] religious similarity [31, 32] and religious groups [31, 33] on FDI and find
that religion does influence FDI. Accordingly, religious pluralism is found to be
positivelly associated with FDI and thus more important compared to religious
similarity, while a study by [31] finds positive relationship between all monotheistic
religious groups (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christian) and FDI, but for
Islam. According to the results of their study, significantly negative relationship is
thus suggested between Buddhism and FDI. No doubt, the results of their study
suggest that MNCs are not indifferent to culture, broadly represented by diverse
religious groups, and that only certain religious groups are positively associated
with FDI. However, the empirical evidence on the matter is scarce and far from
uniform to draw any sensible conclusions.
In this paper we, however, argue that, while religious believes may influence
attitudes toward free market, competition or foreign investors, it may be fairly
misleading to associate specific attitudes and values to individual religious groups per
se, based on our assumptions, generalisation and even pre-assumptions about reli-
gious constituencies of individual nations. This tendency to assign specific societal
attributes to certain religious groups such as is the case of the La Porta et al. study
[34], which prescribe and impose ‘low institutional quality, institutional inefficiency,
political and economic instability, high level of corruption and tax invasion etc.’, to
reside and prevail within the so called ‘hierarchical religious’ such as Catholicism,
Orthodox Christianity and Islam is rather forged, deceptive and ambiguous.
Certainly, a genuine and reasonable approach to study religious aspects of cul-
tural dimension and its relationship to FDI and/or economic growth need be based
on attitudes toward certain economic concepts and principles, as well as on values
assigned to those, including wealth and growth, competition-rivalry and struggle,
market openness and foreign investors. In case, significant differences assigned to
those concepts, could be associated with specific religious believes or related value-
systems, then we could sensibly argue of the prevailing religiously rooted ‘cultural’
differences. This is to say, that we need to investigate the link between religious
beliefs and values assigned to aforementioned economic concepts. How differently
are these concepts perceived and valued by different religious groups need be the
principal question investigated, and not something a priori assumed and assigned to
specific religious groups. In line with this reasoning, for instance, Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales [33] conclude that Catholics and Protestants are more positively asso-
ciated with attitudes favouring market-efficiency and economic growth, while
Muslims are found to be negatively associated with competition. Last but not lease,
if we consider far-reaching cultural differencies existing within supposedly homog-
enous religious groups across different nations, such as is the case of Islamic coun-
tries (Malasya vs. Tukey vs. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran), or cultural differences across
supposedly Catholic states such as is the case of Ireland vs. Poland vs. (South) Italy,
we clearly face the measurement problem that may bias the results. This could
partly explain why number of studies including [34] failed to find significant
impact of religious groups per se on either economic growth or FDI. The notable
exception is the aforementioned study by Lucke and Eichler [31].
Overall, in this paper we argue that analysis of cultural influence on FDI, that
measure cultural diversity via dichotomous variables depicting religious group(s)
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fails to sensibly reflect on the important cultural dimensions that are of relevance
when studying the link between culture and FDI. This is to say, that it is fairly
improper (invalidate) to a priori assign that certain religious groups are indifferent
to economic growth or adversely oriented toward foreigners, unless we truly con-
ceptualise and measure links between prevailing religious beliefs and some ‘rele-
vant’ economic categories or attitudes. Most studies investigating the link between
religious groups and FDI fall short of addressing this issue. We first need to con-
ceptualise on, and empirically establish the link between certain believes and atti-
tudes including individual aspirations for growth, attitudes toward risk and
competition, attitudes toward other groups/individuals and specific religious
groups, as suggested by Guiso et al. study [33], before we examine the relationship
between supposedly distinct religious groups and FDI or economic growth.
The empirical evidence on the matter is far from consistent and far from its
mature phase. In light of this discussion, we argue that although religion constitute
important cultural dimension of a society, it may well be inappropriate and mis-
leading to include religious group(s) as dummy variables in regression equations to
estimate the effect of culture on FDI. In contrast, considering religious diversity or
similarity across nations may reflect on cultural distance that could be associated
with costs of transition to new business or cultural environment. Most empirical
studies have, in fact, followed this line of reasoning where, cultural similarity is
considered important, a priori positive determinant of FDI, as we discuss below.
2.3.2 The relevance of cultural proximity (distance) as determinant of FDI
Kogut and Singh [35], posit that foreign investors prefer investing in countries
culturally similar to their own. Sharing similar attitudes and values implies better
knowledge of the local market, customers and business practices. Greater cultural
differences between the host country and the source country lead to higher costs of
doing business in another culture, such as the cost of obtaining information or the
cost of searching to discover the specifics of the local bureaucracy [31]. This theo-
retical proposition has dominated the research on culture and FDI. Most empirical
studies analyse the impact of cultural distance per se on FDI, and hypothesise that
cultural similarity between home and host countries positively affects FDI flows.
Accordingly, the principal question investigated by researcher refers to the
effect of ‘cultural distance’ on FDI. Siegel and Licht [35] in their analysis using
instrumental variables (social factionalization, dominant religion, 19th century war
experience, previous communist rule) measure how cultural distance in terms of
egalitarianism vs. hierarchy affects FDI flows. The analysis is based on a 2005
Schwartz study [36]. The results obtained explain that the egalitarian distance has a
negative and statistically significant impact on FDI flows. Similarly, [35] conduct a
comprehensive analysis on the impact of cultural distance on FDI. They rely on
‘egalitarianism vs. hierarchy’ dimension of culture developed by Schwarz [36] and
argue that the greater the distance between culture of origin and destination coun-
try the greater the difficulty in interacting with stakeholders in the host country.
The results of their study confirm the negative and significant impact of cultural
distance on FDI. Moreover, [31] study suggest that foreign investors from devel-
oped countries are negatively affected by greater ‘cultural distance’ when investing
in developing and transition economies. Lee, Shenkar, and Li [37] come to similar
conclusions when it comes to the impact of cultural distance measured by Kogut
and Singh index on inward FDI in South Korea.
Number of empirical studies uses cultural proximity as determinant of FDI,
relaying on common language, common history (e.g. colonial legacy, socialist past),
and common border as cultural proxies. Most studies find significant and positive
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impact of cultural proximity along geographical distance on FDI [32, 38]. Lopez-
Duarte and Vidal-Suarez [39] analyse how language distance affects the choice
between greenfield investments and acquisitions when investing in other countries.
383 foreign direct investments from Spain in 44 different countries in the period
1989–2003 were analysed. The authors find strong support for the role of language
distance as the main factor causing transaction costs. The results suggest that
investors avoid acquisitions as a way of investing in countries characterised by high
language distance. Bandelj [40] analysed the cultural connections (presence of a
national minority) between investors and recipients of investments (hosts). It
measures how the presence of national minorities affects the movement of FDI
between pairs of countries. Bilateral flows of 11 Central and Eastern European
countries (recipients of investments) and 27 investor countries were analysed. The
author came to the conclusion that cultural ties that have historically been formed
due to the presence of national minorities of the host country in the investor
country, and vice versa, positively and statistically significantly affect FDI flows
between the two countries.
Although, the results of majority of studies on cultural distance and FDI support
the hypothesis that greater cultural distance negatively affects FDI, and that cultural
proximity plays important role in attracting FDI, studies by Voyer and Beamish [41],
Grosse and Trevino [42] find that cultural distance does not exert significant negative
impact on FDI, and that cultural distance does not seem to influence FDI flows. Tang
[43] reports mixed results on the impact of all cultural distance variables (four
Hofstede cultural indicators) on FDI and concludes that ‘cultural difference does not
always imply cultural conflict’. In similar vein, Barkema, Bell, and Pennings [44]
(following [45]) argue that the risks arising from cultural differences can be over-
come because investors can learn over time how to deal with those differences.
According to them, experienced investors, both from developed and developing
countries, ultimately do not consider cultural differences a significant obstacle.
Analysing the impact of cultural distance on foreign direct investment has,
however, proven to be quite complex resulting in inconclusive and even contradic-
tory empirical evidence. Part of the reason can be attributed to the fact that authors
use different measures of culture from which they construct cultural distance vari-
able, rendering support to the need to understand the mechanism underpinning the
influence of ‘cultural distance’ on FDI. Moreover, the problem of measurement of
cultural distance variable has been investigated by van Hoorn and Maseland [46].
The authors analyse the implications of using ‘cultural distance’ variable, defined as
a difference between home and host country scores of one or more cultural dimen-
sions, on robustness of the empirical results obtained. They conclude that one
cannot compare the impact of this ‘cultural distance variable’ on FDI for different
countries of origin. Following the conclusions emanating from their study, Kapas
and Czegledi [47] construct a ‘cultural distance’ variable taking into account the
problem of ‘the mixed impact of cultural distance and the culture in the host
country’ when constructing cultural distance variable. Essentially, the results of
their study suggest that the impact of culture measured in levels on FDI is greater
than the impact of ‘cultural distance’ variables. The results of their study along the
van Hoorn and Maseland [46] study clearly suggest the possible bias effect of earlier
studies analysing the impact of ‘cultural distance’ on FDI.
In light of this discussion and in view of the important insights arising from the
previous empirical work, in this study we analyse the impact of culture on FDI in
transition economies while highlighting the following:
i. The importance of cultural features of host economy that are independent
of culture of the origin country, that is of specific values that could be
10
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attributed to individual national cultures as ‘core’ to comprehending the
cultural influences on FDI
ii. The importance of analysing the impact of institutional and cultural factors
in an integrated empirical framework in which we take control of both
institutional and cultural factors and examine their relative importance on
FDI
In view of the possible biases associated with the ‘cultural distance variable’
constructed by subcontracting the origin form destination country cultural scores,
we refrain from using ‘cultural distance’ variable in our empirical analysis. On the
contrary, we postulate the importance of specific and intrinsic cultural features that
reflect on deep cultural traits and different cultural models, developed by Hofstede
[48, 49] to be important determinant of FDI. In what follows, we discuss the
relevance of Hofstede cultural factors as determinants of FDI inflows. The impact of
these factors has been fairly under-researched in transition economy context.
2.4 Which cultural factors matter for FDI and why: measurement issues
and hypothesis
We postulated earlier that culture is important aspect of informal institutions.
As such culture is associated with way formal institutions function, their quality and
efficiency. Apart from this, local culture is associated with ‘social risk’ of investment
and transition to a new market embedded in social relations. Risks associated with
cross-border business go beyond economic analysis and economic risks. The social
characteristics are important determinant of FDI in that they influence operational
and the external environment of business, influencing business success factors in
the long run. Social characteristics depicted in cultural dimensions of a society are
considered important to the internationalisation process ([50] as companies do not
perform their businesses in isolation from other firms and/or networks of firms [51]
nor do they construct their internal capabilities in isolation. Local work ethics,
values and attitudes affect business performance of foreign companies through
social relations of the workforce. All economic activities are ‘submerged in social
relations’ [52]. Social characteristics and relations are embedded in cultural dimen-
sions of a society.
Research on culture attempted to define important elements and dimensions of
national culture relating to both conscious and unconscious set of beliefs, values and
norms that reflect general attitudes and preferences of a society. Hofstede study and
the model of national culture presents a systematic and pioneering work on the
matter, that had a major influence on understanding cultural differences among
nations [52]. Hofstede introduced four cultural dimensions of a society, namely
Power Distance (PDI); Masculinity (MAS); Individualism (IDV); and Uncertainty
Avoidance (UAI). The fifth cultural dimension, Long term orientation (LTO) was
later developed and added as additional variable by Hofstede and Bond (1988).
Further research on cultural dimension and its measurement resulted in the devel-
opment of the Globe cultural dimensions (Global Leadership and Organisational
Behaviour Effectivness, Kogut and Singh’s Index of cultural distance [53] and
Schwarz Value Survey [36]. The literature has critically assessed various aspects of
these cultural indices, including the Hofstede work on culture and cultural dimen-
sions [54–56]. Most of criticism is related to the problem of time invariant nature of
cultural indices including Hofstende cultural dimensions, and lack of genuine
(socio) anthropological aspect of culture. In this research we follow arguments
presented in [57] on the rationale of using Hofstede cultural indicators
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encompassing discussion related to the i) the benefits of using separate indices
rather than aggregate cultural distance indices developed by Korgut and Singh (see
[57]); ii) the stability of cultural values over time and the empirical evidence
pointing to no significant variation of Hofstede indices over time; iii) the benefits of
using Hofstede cultural dimensions over other indices that have been originally
developed using Hofstede cultural dimensions such as is the case of the Globe
indices or Kogut and Singh’s Index. Thus, Hofstede [58] argues that the Globe index
is deficient amid its complexity and, as such is less useful in empirical analysis,
while Shenkar [59] points that we lose important information relying on aggregate
cultural index i.e. Kogut and Singh’s Index. In what follows we present the five
Hofstede cultural dimensions, brifly review the empirical literature using Hofstede
indicators and present the hypothesis.
2.4.1 Power distance index (PDI)
The first cultural dimension is Power Distance. This cultural dimension uncovers
general perception of social inequality predominantly related to power concentra-
tion and social status [60].
This dimension represents the degree to which less powerful members of society
within their institutions (family, school, etc.) expect and accept that power is
unequally distributed. People are not equal by nature and inequality is present in
every profession, but this fact is experienced in different ways. The distance of
power actually shows how society faces inequalities. And the main issue that this
index deals with is how society solves inequalities among people. People in societies
that have a greater degree of power distance accept a hierarchical order in which
everyone has their place and do not require further explanations. In these societies,
independence is a feature of a small group of people, and others depend on them.
On the other hand, in societies with a low degree of power distance, people try to
equalise the distribution of power and look for explanations for the unequal distri-
bution of power. There is interdependence between people, and subordinates per-
ceive orders as ordinary people, and superiors are available to subordinates [61].
This cultural dimension uncovers general perception of social inequality pre-
dominantly related to power concentration and social status (Ferraro, 2002). Hav-
ing said this, it’s worth emphasising that it indicates ‘the degree to which members
of an organisation or society expect and agree that power should be unequally
shared’ [62]. Applied to a firm level, it could be fairly assumed that the lower the
index the higher the demand from workers within an organisation for more equally
distribution of power (wealth) and higher the demand for ‘justification for’ and
‘rationale behind’ certain decisions or actions on a company level. All of these could
lead to potential conflict between the workers and their superiors. Dispute and
conflict(s) may arise from supposedly higher intolerance toward specific hierarchi-
cal structure of power, injustice or inequalities. Members of such society (workers
within companies) prefer more horizontal organisational structure. On the other
side, workers within societies with high power distance indices may be assumed to
be: i) more submissive to ‘formal power structure’ and associated social distances;
ii) to have lower levels of self-esteem associated with conflict-avoidance, (positive)
affirmation and obedience. All of these lead to higher tolerance of: improper com-
munication, improper job appraisal, overtime and unpaid work, and high tolerance
of wage gaps that may be persistent within particular organisation. In light of this
discussion it is firmly difficult to hypothesise what are the preferred cultural fea-
tures by multinational companies seeking investments abroad. Whether a particular
MNC prefer societies with high or lower Power distance depend on host of factors
including company culture, organisational structure and motive of investment.
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As for the latter, we argue clearly that internationalisation of production activities
through FDI seeking natural resource and/or cost-efficiency is concerned with, or
values, work ethics that has a respect for ‘social hierarchical distance’. On this
ground it seems plausible to argue that MNC seeking to access resources or to
reduce production costs prefer societies with higher Power Distance. Given the
specific context of our research the positive relationship between PDI and FDI
could be assumed. However, from theoretical perspective, we do acknowledge that
the sign of the relationship could go both ways.
H1: Power Distance positively affects foreign direct investments in transition economies.
2.4.2 Individualism versus collectivism (IDV)
Societies in which the degree of individualism is higher compared to collectivism
value the efforts of the individual more than the collective and team results. Collec-
tivism, on the other side represents a firmer social framework in which individuals
can expect their extended family or some other group to care for them in exchange
for unquestioning loyalty. Individualism, on the other hand, uncover preference that
everyone is responsible only for themselves, the emphasis is on individualism and the
ideal is leadership, belonging to an organisation is optional, the identity of the indi-
vidual is based on his personal characteristics. Collectivism emphasises the organisa-
tion, the ideal is group membership, belonging to an organisation is a matter of
morality, the identity of an individual is based on his belonging to the collective [52].
In view of this, in this research, we posit that more individualistic societies have
positive attitudes toward competition and rivalry, with individuals beingmore deter-
mined and oriented toward self-interests, self-promotion and struggle for achieve-
ment. The individualistic society is thus characterised with proactive individuals, who
strive to achieve their goals based on their individual efforts, and are less relying on
social-framework. In view of this, we argue that individualist societies embody values
and attitudes conducive to economic growth and efficiency, and are more likely to
and/or that they willingly engage in ‘competitive (social) struggle’ that underpins
productivity growth. Hence, the positive relationship between IDV and FDI is
anticipated.
H2: Individualism positively affects foreign direct investments in transition economies.
2.4.3 Masculinity versus femininity (MAS)
These dimensions do not describe a person’s gender but character in humans.
Societies ruled by masculinity indicate that society has propensities for heroism,
assertiveness, authority, success, and material rewards for success. Society as a
whole is more competitive, money and material goods are important, successful and
independent people are respected, and people are valued according to the material
goods they own. The opposite of masculinity is femininity which signifies modesty
and a propensity for agreement. Also, indulgence and consensus are considered
women’s values, as well as caring for the weaker, and people in society are more
focused on quality of life [52].
According to [63], apparently, more masculine societies uncover cultural models
that value material goods andmaterial rewards for success, as opposed to quality of life
and merits associated with common good that present attitudes of more feminine
societies. Having said this, it could be reasonably expected that more Masculine socie-
ties are characterised by individuals and leaders who are competitiveness driven and
whomanage business operations by objectives. Such leaders are less sensitive to social
or employee issues, they are decisive and act in isolation. On the other hand, leaders
and managers of organisations of more feminine societies prefer consensus over
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aggressiveness. In view of this, it could be reasonably assumed that more masculine
societies are more competitive societies, assumed to be societal attributes that foster
better economic performance in general framework of a capitalist society. Notwith-
standing this, it could be argued, that masculine culture traits embodied in an individ-
ual managers are not always preferred byMNCs. In case MNC’s organisational culture
rests on assertiveness and collective affirmation, and in case company values
organisational capabilities as opposed to self-affirmation of individual employees,more
feminine model of culture may be preferred. In light of this discussion, we assume that
more masculine societies could be both positively and negatively related to FDI.
H3: Masculinity positively (negatively) affects foreign direct investments in transition
economies.
2.4.4 Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI)
This dimension expresses the degree to which members of society feel fear or
discomfort from an unfamiliar situation. This index is often misinterpreted as risk
aversion. Risk avoidance is a characteristic of the individual, while uncertainty
avoidance is a feature of society. The basic question this index deals with is: should we
try to control the future or just let it happen? We have societies that are actively
dealing with the future, i.e. they have inherent control, and societies where events are
out of control (fatalism). Countries with high DACI exhibit “rigid” behaviours and
are intolerant of unusual behaviours and ideas. Such nations prefer strict and precise
rules of conduct in society, regulations and guidelines to minimise uncertainty. Peo-
ple in such societies feel more comfortable when there is a clear structure and when
society is well organised. On the other hand, countries where the DACI is low reflect a
more relaxed attitude in which practice is more important than rules. In such societies
there is aversion to any rules and norms. But if aversion is “moderate,” then it’s
mostly societies that are more creative and flexible. People in such societies use
common sense when making decisions and rely less on prescribed rules [52].
Overall, it could be said that societies with high uncertainty avoidance are
characterised with high emotional resistance to change and may feel anxious about
the future [60]. It could be reasonable assumed then, that these societies are reluc-
tant to working in unfamiliar (uncertain) environment linked to foreign companies,
and may be resistant to changes in organisational structure, or any changes in
business conduct. As for the former, they can present additional obstacles to foreign
companies, and may thus result in “discrimination by the government, consumers,
and suppliers” [64]. As for the latter feature, it is probably least preferred by
international business, amid the dynamics of changes of microeconomic determi-
nants of global industry competitiveness and the constantly changing international
business environment. Bearing this in mind, we hypothesise that uncertainty
avoidance exhibit a negative influence on FDI.
H4: UAI negatively affects foreign direct investments in transition economies.
2.4.5 Long term orientation versus short term normative orientation (LTO)
A society from a long-term oriented environment cultivates virtues that are
future-oriented - perseverance, thrift, while societies from a short-term oriented
environment cultivate virtues that are related to the past and present - respect for
tradition and fulfilment of social obligations. Societies that have a low LTO index
generally prefer to maintain traditions and norms that have been respected in the
past, while social changes are viewed with suspicion. On the other hand, societies
with a high LTO have a somewhat more pragmatic approach: they encourage sav-
ings and innovation in education as a way to prepare society for the future [52].
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As far as the latter characteristic is concerned it could be argued that MNCs prefer
societies with long-term, rather than short-term orientation.
H:5 LTO positively affects foreign direct investments in transition economies.
2.5 Review of empirical literature on the impact of Hofstede cultural factors
on FDI
Holmes et al. and Mac-Dermott and Mornah conducted research on how collec-
tivism and future orientation affect the movement of inward FDI [65, 66]. Data
from the Global Leadership project and the effectiveness of organisational behav-
iour (House et al., 2002) were used. The analysis was conducted on 50 countries (21
from Europe, 15 from Asia, 9 from North, South and Central America, 3 from
Africa, 2 from Australia) for a period of nine years. They came to the conclusion
that the greater presence of collectivism in society negatively affects the attraction
of FDI, and that societies that are future-oriented promote capital investment of
domestic entities. Bezpaliukh (2016) using Hofstede’s dimensions in his paper ana-
lyzes how cultural factors, primarily concentration of power, avoidance of uncer-
tainty, and language influence the attraction of DSI. The analysis covers post-Soviet
bloc countries (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) and the
results suggest that a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance, a lower concentration
of power and a common language have a positive effect on FDI inflows.
Bhardwaj, Dietz, and Beamish analysed how cultural factors, more precisely the
avoidance of uncertainty and trust, influence the choice of locations of foreign
companies [67]. They concluded that foreign companies prefer to invest in coun-
tries that have a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance and a high level of trust.
Steigner, Riedy, and Bauman examined the impact of Hofstede’s cultural dimen-
sions on DSI flows. [68]. They came to the conclusion through OLS regression that
countries with civil law and countries with customary law prefer to invest in
different countries and sectors. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are also analysed by
Goraieb [69]. They conducted an MRQAP analysis on the example of 45 countries
and came to the conclusion that firms avoid investing in countries that differ from
theirs in terms of the presence of a high degree of uncertainty. Also, firms prefer to
invest in countries that are similar to theirs in terms of power concentration. What
these four studies have in common is that they all use Hofstede’s cultural factors.
We will also use Hofstede indices in this study. Most research focus on specific
factors such as collectivism and future orientation or avoidance of uncertainty and
trust [65, 67]. We contribute to the literature on foreign direct investment by
testing the widest possible set of cultural dimensions that can influence the invest-
ment decisions of foreign companies in a particular country. Unlike previous
research, we include 8 transition economies as host countries. The analysis includes
also the four countries of Southeast Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia)
that have not been previously investigated. Using a bilateral econometric
framweork on FDI stock gives us the opportunity to question in more detail the
importance of cultural and institutional factors in explaining differencies in FDI.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1 Model and data issues
In order to analyse the impact of institutional and cultural determinants on FDI,
we pursue a panel data analysis. The empirical analysis covers four South East Euro-
pean countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia) and five Central and Eastern
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European countries (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) in
the period from 2000 to 2018, containing information on FDI and host country
characteristics. Each observation point in our dataset reveals FDI flows between
home country “i” (ten major trading partners) and host country “j” in the period
under observation. We develop a baseline specification of the following form:
Ln FDIijt ¼ β0 þ β1 ln GDPit þ β2 ln GDPjt þ β3 DISTijt þ β4 INFLjt þ β5 TradeOjt
þ β6 ln WAGEjt þ Countryþ Timeþ εi
(1)
Where
lnFDIijt denotes log FDI stock between home i and host countries j in period t;
lnGDPit denotes log of gross domestic product of home country i in the period t;
lnGDPjt denotes log of gross domestic product of home country i in the period t;
DISTijt denotes log distance between capital cities of host and home countries;
INFLjt denotes the inflation rate of the host country j in the period t;
TradeOjt denotes exports and imports share in GDP of the country i in the period t;
WAGEjt denotes relative unit labour cost of the host country j in the period t;
Country denotes country dummy variables used to control for time-invariant
country specific effects;
Time denotes year dummy variables used to control for time specific effect; and.
εit —random error (structure eit determined by the Fixed Effect (FE) model).
We then investigate which particular features of institutional quality are impor-
tant determinant of FDI flows in transition economy context while incorporating
three individual institutional indicators in equations of the form:
Ln FDIijt ¼ β0 þ β1 ln GDPit þ β2 ln GDPjt þ β3 DISTijt þ β4 INFLjt þ β5 TradeOjt
þ β6 ln WAGEjt þ β8 INSTjtþ Countryþ Timeþ εi
(2)
where INSTjt represents institutional quality indicators developed by the World
Bank including Government Effectiveness (GovEffjt), Control of Corruption
(Corruptjt) and Rule of Law (R_Lawjt).
As noted earlier, the purpose of this empirical analysis is to examine whether
cultural effects play an important role in explaining differences in bilateral foreign
direct investment flows in the context of transition countries. With this in mind and
in line with the previously reviewed empirical literature, we further expand the
analysis and include cultural distance variables in our model. Using Hofstede’s cul-
tural dimensions, we decide to utilise the gravity equation to analyse the impact of
individualism (IDV), power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), masculin-
ity (MAS) and long-term orientation (LTO) on FDI. More specifically, we have:
Ln FDIijt ¼ β0 þ β1 ln GDPit þ β2 ln GDPjt þ β3 DISTijt þ β4 INFLjt þ β5 TradeOjt
þ β6 ln WAGEjt þ β7 PDIjt þ β8 IDV jtþ β9 MASjt þ β10 UAIjt
þ β11 LTOjt þ Countryþ Timeþ εi
(3)
3.2 Data and variables
3.2.1 Dependent variable
In this research, we use FDI as our dependent variable which is the log of stock
FDI between home and host countries in EUR. According to Christie (2003),
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looking at the stock level has the advantage of stripping out the business cycle and
any other ‘time anomalies’. In addition, another reason for this choice is related to
the functional form of the gravity equation because FDI inflows can be nil or even
negative, which is something that the gravity equation cannot account for. The
source of data for this variable is Database on FDI published by The Vienna Institute
for International Economic Studies (WIIW).
3.2.2 Institutional variables
According to North (1990), good institutions influence economic activities
through various channels, such as reducing transaction and production costs.
Moreover, quality institutions help reduce operating costs, which increases
profitability. Foreign investors are reluctant to invest in a risky and unconvincing
environment and prefer locations that offer the best economic and institutional
environment. Lucas (1993) suggests that in transition economies, institutional
factors play an important role in attracting foreign investment compared to purely
economic factors.
In order to estimate the impact of institutional determinants on FDI, we employ
three indices developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi including government
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption [70]. Each governance index
ranges from 2.5 to +2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better governance
outcomes. Government effectiveness (GovEff) assesses the soundness of the host
country’s policies and the efficiency of the administration that implements them.
Rule of law (Rule) measures the confidence of agents in the rules of society,
including the quality of contract enforcement, property rights and the effectiveness
of the judiciary. Control of corruption (CCorr) measures corruption among public
and private officials and the extent of bribery. The source of data for these variables
is the World Bank. A detailed description of each institutional variable used in this
analysis is given in Table 1.
3.2.3 Cultural variables
Our variable of interest is the cultural variable. Our measure of cultural variable
is based on the scores developed by Geert Hofstede, which reflect country averages




“Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
such policies.”
Rule of Law (RoL) “Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence.”
Control of Corruption
(CCorr)
“Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.”
Source [71].
Table 1.
Description of institutional variables.
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description of each cultural variable according to Hofstede (2018) used in this
analysis is given in Table 2.
In our sample, the scores for the cultural variables can take values between 0 and
100, with a higher value indicating that power distance, individualism, masculinity,
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation are more firmly entrenched in a




“This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a
society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The fundamental
issue here is how a society handles inequalities among people. People in
societies exhibiting a large degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order
in which everybody has a place, and which needs no further justification. In
societies with low Power Distance, people strive to equalise the distribution of
power and demand justification for inequalities of power.”
Individualism (IDV) “The high side of this dimension, called Individualism, can be defined as a
preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are
expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Its
opposite, Collectivism, represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in
society in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a
particular ingroup to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A
society’s position on this dimension is reflected in whether people’s self-image
is defined in terms of ‘I’ or ‘we’.”
Masculinity (MAS) “The Masculinity side of this dimension represents a preference in society for
achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards for success. Society
at large is more competitive. Its opposite, Femininity, stands for a preference
for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. Society at
large is more consensus-oriented. In the business context Masculinity versus
Femininity is sometimes also related to as ‘tough versus tender’ cultures.”
Uncertainty
Avoidance (UAI)
“The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which the
members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. The
fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can
never be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen?
Countries exhibiting strong Uncertainty Avoidance maintain rigid codes of
belief and behaviour, and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas.
Weak Uncertainty Avoidance societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in
which practice counts more than principles.”
Long Term
Orientation (LTO)
“Every society has to maintain some links with its own past while dealing with
the challenges of the present and the future. Societies prioritise these two
existential goals differently. Societies who score low on this dimension, for
example, prefer to maintain time-honoured traditions and norms while
viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with a culture which scores high,
on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift and
efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future. In the business
context, this dimension is referred to as “(short-term) normative versus (long-
term) pragmatic” (PRA). In the academic environment, the terminology
Monumentalism versus Flexhumility is sometimes also used.”
Indulgence (IND) “Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic
and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint
stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by
means of strict social norms.”
Source [52].
Table 2.




Further, we incorporate a set of control variables. In our model we include
information on gross domestic product of home and host country (GDPi and
GDPj), distance (DIS), labour cost (LC) and inflation rate (INF), which
proved to be significant in a number of previous empirical studies on FDI
determinants.
As stipulated by the gravity model, both home and host countries’ market size
are important determinants of FDI. The market size of the home country is a proxy
for the economic power of the source country. The host country GDP serves as a
proxy for the host country market size and thus the potential market for the
investor’s products. We expect the coefficients of both GDP variables to be positive.
The source of data for this variable is The Vienna Institute for International
Economic Studies (WIIW).
Distance in this research pertains to geographic distance and serves as a proxy
for all possible transportation and operating costs (see [72, 73]). The rationale
behind including geographic distance to explain FDI is the greater cost of obtaining
relevant information as well as the difficulties in managing affiliates in distant
regions. The distance in this paper represents the geographical distance between the
capital cities of home and host country in km. The source of data for this variable is
CEPII database.
Furthermore, the prevailing factors for attracting FDI, besides market size and
access to host market, certainly include the costs of the input factor. Previous
empirical studies show that labour costs have a significant impact on FDI and play a
crucial role in labour-intensive industries, as lower labour costs attract more
investment. Studies suggest a double effect of labour costs. Numerous studies show
that labour costs have a negative impact on foreign direct investment inflows,
which is in line with the findings of Bevan and Estrin [74]. On the other hand,
certain authors found that labour costs have a negative but statistically insignificant
impact on FDI [75]. In our analysis unit labour cost is measured as average gross
monthly wages. The source of data for this variable is UNECE.
We incorporate inflation rate as a control variable in our model. Inflation rate is
often used as a proxy for macroeconomic stability in general. Political and macro-
economic stability along with transparency of legal regulations, such as land acqui-
sition and repatriation of profits, can be important when making investment
decisions [76]. The lack of macroeconomic stability creates a high degree of uncer-
tainty for investment projects. Successful implementation of economic reforms in
transition countries can be a good sign for potential investors to invest, given that
stable macroeconomic performance implies lower investment risk. Thus, the lower
the average inflation rate is in the host country, the more foreign investment will be
attracted to the country [77]. We expect that foreign investment, ceteris paribus,
will be attracted to countries with lower inflation rates. Source for this variable is
IMF database.
Finally, we incorporate openness as a control variable in our model. Previous
empirical results show that the openness of the economy is positively and statisti-
cally related to attracting foreign direct investment. Mphigalale states in its research
that the openness of the economy contributes to attracting foreign direct invest-
ment in transition countries, but this must be complemented by appropriate mac-
roeconomic policies [78]. The openness of the economy is the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured by gross domestic product (Table 3).
The source of data for this variable is the World Bank. Descriptive statistics
for each variable are presented in Table 3 while the correlation matrix is in
Appendix 1.
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3.3 Methodology
In order to account for the panel structure of the data, we use bilateral fixed
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimations. To choose between the FE and
RE estimator, the Hausman (1978) test statistics are computed. The results of
Hausman test showed that the model should be set as fixed effect model. This type
of model is basically an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression that includes a
dummy variable for each country to account for country-specific effects (LSDV
model). The OLS method is optimal if error processes have the same variance
(homoscedasticity) and all of the error processes are independent of each other.
According to Plümper et al. [79] panel data typically display contemporaneous
correlation across units (i.e. large errors for country i at time t will often be associ-
ated with large errors for country j at time t), unit level heteroskedasity (i.e.
variances of the error processes differ from country to country) and serial correla-
tion (i.e. errors for each country show temporal dependence) making inference
from standard errors produced by LSDV incorrect.
In order to test for possible serial correlation, we employ the Wooldridge (2002)
test which indicates the presence of serial correlation in the panel data. In addition,
the Breusch and Pagan test and Pasaran CD (cross-sectional dependence) test
indicate a significant presence of heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional depen-
dence/contemporaneous correlation. To avoid these problems, we follow Beck and
Katz’s recommended procedure, using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors
(PCSE), a method widely used in empirical research that assumes by default that
the disturbances are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across
panels [79, 80]. This estimation approache is the suitable method to test our
hypotheses with the available data and provides efficient and robust outcomes,
suitable for formulating accurate conclusions. We note that we do not make use the
alternative the Generalised method of moments estimator due it is not feasible for
our data set (see [81]).
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lnFDI 1112 9.02 0.43 6.80 10.69
lnGDPhost 1197 24.72 1.16 21.97 27.09
lnGDPhome 1197 27.24 1.40 23.73 29.01
Distance 1197 949.92 468.34 59.61 2126.43
Inflation 1197 4.09 8.96 2 112
Trade oppeness 1197 111.92 36.34 24.17 192.34
lnWage 1064 6.55 0.63 4.24 7.33
IDV 1216 49.75 17.61 25 80
PDI 1216 68 19.49 40 104
UAI 1216 77.12 13.93 51 93
MAS 1216 59 25.72 30 110
LTO 1216 25 6.76 15 33
GovEff 1224 0.46 0.48 0.84 1.16
RoL 1224 0.32 0.60 1.27 1.37





Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the econometric analysis of the model
specifications presented above. Specifically, the table reports OLS fixed effect panel
data estimates with panel-corrected standard errors. We first estimate Eqs. (1)
using three individual subdimensions of institutional development singly due to the
problem of multicollinearity between the individual institutional variables.
The “traditional” gravity variables in all specifications are proved to behave as
expected. Both host and host countries’ economic size, proxied by GDP levels, are
important determinants of FDI. The distance variable is also found to have signifi-
cant implications for FDI flows which is in line with the gravity model hypothesis
and previous empirical findings.
We find that labour costs adversely affect FDI flows. The coefficient on labour
cost is negative and significant at 1% level. The coefficient of Trade openness is
positive and significant at 5%, whereas the inflation rate is not suggested to influ-
ence FDI flows. This result may be explained by the observation that we are no
longer in the early years of the transition process and all transition countries from
the sample are characterised with relatively stable macroeconomic environment.
When it comes to institutions, the most important conclusion resulting from our
analysis suggests that institutional variables do not exhibit significant influence on
FDI flows in transition countries. The results obtained in this analysis are consistent
with those obtained by Lucke and Eichler who study the impact of institutions and
cultural factors in an integrated empirical framework [31]. Noteworthy is that
institutional variables remain insignificant even when including lagged values, and
the results are robust to different model specifications (i.e. manufacturing value
added, productivity levels and differentials, population).
Regarding cultural determinants of bilateral FDI, Table 4 reports the results
based on the Hofstede cultural frameworkandsummarizestheresults for











































Rule of Law 0.051
(0.369)
Notes: All the regressions include a constant, country and time dummies (not reported in the Table 4).
*Statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
**Statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
***Statistical significance at the 1 per- cent level.
Table 4.
Regression results: FDI and institutions (OLS with PCSE).
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thecoefficientson fivecultural indicatorsincludingindividualism (IDV), power dis-
tance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), masculinity (MAS) and long-term ori-
entation (LTO).
We find that higher levels of individualism, power distance and long-term
orientation in the host countries have significant impact on the FDI. Meanwhile,
thecoefficients on uncertainty avoidance andmasculinity are negative
andsignificant as expected. Thus, theresults render support to the a priori postu-
lated hypothesis.
4. Conclusion
Foreign Direct Investments has been largely found to positively affect economic
growth in transition economies. Increases in FDI have been associated with pro-
ductivity and export growth of local companies via knowledge spillovers and com-
plementary effects on domestic investment. The impact of FDI on economic growth
seems, however, conditional on the level of human capital and absorptive capacity
of a host economy. Determinants of FDI in transition economies have been
intensely researched highlighting the importance of traditional factors, institutions
and policy choices in determining locational decisions of multinational corpora-




















Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 0.005***
(0.000)
Long-term orientation (LTO) 0.003***
(0.016)
Notes: All the regressions include a constant, country and time dummies (not reported in the Table 5).
*Statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
**Statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
***Statistical significance at the 1 per- cent level.
Table 5.
Regression results: FDI and culture (OLS with PCSE).
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characterised as important factors that off-set for the underdeveloped institutional
capacity of transition economies, the impact of cultural ties on FDI remains fairly
under researched. Informal economic structures and cultural similarities emanate
trust and enable strong business ties across borders. How important are these
factors in explaining differences in FDI flows among transition economies is the
principal question investigated in this research.
The cultural features seem to have been disregarded as important factors which
influence the way in which markets develop and evolve. Homogenous cultures tend
to understand the rules and norms of social behaviour in which firms operate and
construct their capabilities. These tacit aspects of market, reflected in diverse cul-
tural features of a society, shape and model the behaviour of local economic agents.
As such, these are also likely to influence MNC’s decisions on where to invest. They
seem to reveal hidden behavioural patterns that underpin societal prosperity, such
as responsibility, ethics and trust. The idea that these norms affect companies’
efficiency and growth prospects cannot be dismissed. On the contrary, these factors
should be perceived as important determinants of FDI that not only minimise
transaction costs, but also enhance productivity potential of foreign affiliates, and/
or simply create an environment conducive to business growth. Such an environ-
ment is perceived as friendly and or familiar market from MNC perspective.
We rely on gravity econometric framework and examine the impact of cultural
factors on FDI using bilateral FDI flows between home (i.e. major trading partners)
8 transition economies, depicted as host countries, in the period 2000–2018. We
study this relationship in an integrated framework considering principal gravity
forces, traditional FDI determinants, policy and institutional factors.
In this research we provide strong and robust evidence that cultural factors,
depicted in Hofmann cultural indices, influence MNCs’ locational decisions. Other
things held constant, specific cultural features seem more important than formal
institutions, which seems at odds with standard neoclassical propositions, and shed
some new light on the way we understand international business transactions.
Having said this, here we do not intend to generalise our findings, since we
examine the relative importance of cultural factors measured in levels, and assigned
to certain cultural values, in attracting FDI in the specific context of transition
economies. However, we do pay attention to the relative importance of formal
institutions in explaining differences in bilateral FDI stock between selected transi-
tion economies considered as host economies in our analysis. The fact that institu-
tional factors have not proven to exert significant influence on FDI in our analysis
does not imply that formal institutions are not important or of lesser importance.
We, however, believe that more work on the matter of interplay between culture
and formal institutions in comprehending differences in inward FDI flows is
needed. Future research should focus on disentangling the impact of institutions
possibly conditional on some important, intrinsic cultural values. The nature of our
dataset inhibits further investigation of the possible interplay, suggested by the Du
et al. study [82].
Appendix 1
| logFDI logGDPt logGDPe DISTANCE INFL TradeO logWagt GovEff R_Law Corrupt PDI
———————————+———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
logFDI | 1.0000
logGDPhost | 0.5809 1.0000
logGDPhome | 0.2727 0.0411 1.0000
DISTANCE | -0.1890 -0.3242 0.3486 1.0000
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INFL | -0.1338 -0.2630 -0.0591 -0.0050 1.0000
TradeO | 0.0560 0.0196 0.0746 0.0290 -0.2563 1.0000
logWagehost | 0.2710 0.4907 0.1298 -0.1621 -0.4883 0.4015 1.0000
GovEff | 0.1631 0.2069 0.0350 0.0064 -0.3580 0.5840 0.5953 1.0000
R_Law | 0.2140 0.2824 0.0441 0.1055 -0.3268 0.5579 0.5404 0.9373 1.0000
Corrupt | 0.0770 0.0669 0.0362 0.2775 -0.2848 0.4105 0.4304 0.8394 0.8946 1.0000
PDI | -0.0495 0.0364 -0.0221 -0.3175 0.0878 -0.1498 -0.1013 -0.3901 -0.5724 -0.5897 1.0000
IDV | 0.2657 0.3912 0.0003 0.0082 -0.1425 0.5403 0.3158 0.6734 0.7871 0.6845 -0.5641
MAS | 0.2096 0.4224 -0.0236 -0.3800 -0.0569 0.4921 0.1989 0.2574 0.1797 0.0102 0.4222
UAI | 0.1929 0.3534 -0.0150 -0.0454 0.1184 -0.6783 -0.2291 -0.6100 -0.4481 -0.4224 -0.1482
IVR | 0.2433 0.4877 -0.0453 -0.6144 0.0221 -0.2467 0.2786 -0.0731 -0.1599 -0.2871 0.2971
| IDV MAS UAI IVR
———————————+—————————————————————————————
IDV | 1.0000
MAS | 0.4786 1.0000
UAI | -0.2121 -0.3567 1.0000
IVR | 0.0659 0.4164 0.3032 1.0000
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